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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of simultaneous sensor fault detection, isolation, and networked
estimation of linear full-rank dynamical systems. The proposed networked estimation is a variant of
single time-scale protocol and is based on (i) consensus on a-priori estimates and (ii) measurement
innovation. The necessary connectivity condition on the sensor network and stabilizing block-diagonal
gain matrix is derived based on our previous works. Considering additive faults in the presence of
system and measurement noise, the estimation error at sensors is derived and proper residuals are
defined for fault detection. Unlike many works in the literature, no simplifying upper-bound condition
on the noise is considered and we assume Gaussian system/measurement noise. A probabilistic threshold
is then defined for fault detection based on the estimation error covariance norm. Finally, a graph-
theoretic sensor replacement scenario is proposed to recover possible loss of networked observability
due to removing the faulty sensor. We examine the proposed fault detection and isolation scheme on an
illustrative academic example to verify the results and make a comparison study with related literature.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) is an emerging topic of recent literature in control and
signal-processing [1]. In general, a fault is characterized as an unpermitted deviation or mal-
function of (at least) one of the system parameters/properties from its standard condition, which
may take place at the plant, sensor, or actuator. Fault Detection, Isolation, and Reconfiguration
(FDIR) is therefore a methodology to ensure acceptable system operation and to compensate
for occurrence of faults detected by FDI module [1]. The fault diagnosis schemes are spanned
from the centralized approaches [2]–[4] to more recent distributed methods [5]–[11]. Indeed,
with recent technological trends, many practical systems of interest are either large-scale or
physically distributed, and thus it is required to develop distributed or networked FDI strategies.
Toward this goal, in this paper, the problem of simultaneous sensor fault detection, isolation and
networked estimation of dynamical system is investigated.
Fault detection and isolation in networked dynamical systems has been extensively studied
in the literature. In [6], an FDI strategy is proposed for a distributed heterogeneous multi-
agent system and in [7], fault detection of a group of interconnected noise-free individual
subsystems is considered such that each subsystem is able to detect faults in its neighborhood.
In [8], an FDI problem for interconnected double-integrator system under unknown system
faults and fault-free measurements is investigated such that almost all faults except the faults
with zero dynamics can be detected. Similarly, in [9], a faulty second-order dynamical system
(representing a heterogeneous multi-agent system) is considered with bounded disturbance and
fault-free measurements and a distributed observer-based FDI strategy is proposed. The case
of homogeneous multi-agent linear systems under upper-bounded system noise is considered
in [10], where a distributed observer-based FDI based on fault-free measurements is developed
to detect faults at agents. Development of FDI on noise-free faulty systems monitored by a
multi-agent network communicating under an event-triggered framework is considered in [11].
It should be noted that most of these works are with the main aim of fault detection and the
state estimation of the underlying dynamical system is not considered.
The other related trend in the literature is attack detection and resilient/secure estimation,
both centralized [12]–[18] and distributed [19]–[27]. Distributed estimation strategies are more
prominent in recent years due to emergence of large-scale applications. In [19], a distributed H∞
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3observer is proposed to detect admissible biasing attacks over distributed estimation networks
by introducing an auxiliary input tracking model. In [20], both false-data injection attack at the
system/process and jamming attack at the communication network of sensors are considered and
in [21], a distributed gradient descent protocol is adopted to optimize the norm of the covariance
of the measurement updates as the cost function. In [22], a distributed method is proposed to
estimate the system state over a k-regular sensor network under attacked noise-free measurements
and in [23], a distributed resilient estimation scheme is proposed where the time-scale of the
sensors (as estimators) needs to be faster than the system dynamics.
Secure distributed estimation of cyber-physical systems composed of interconnected subsys-
tems each monitored by a sensor under possible unidentifiable attack is discussed in [24]. In
[25], secure distributed estimators for noise-free system and measurements is proposed over
dynamic sensor networks subject to communication loss. Other relevant works include secure
estimation based on reachability analysis in [26] and static parameter estimation in [27]. Note
that most of these works propose a resilient estimation protocol under sensor attack, where no
attack detection and isolation scheme is considered. In general, distributed fault/attack detection
finds application in cases where the centralized architecture is not possible or not desirable, as
in smart-grid monitoring [28], large-scale wind-farms [29], and networked unmanned vehicles
[30].
In this paper, a quantitative model-based method is adopted, as in the observer-based methods,
to develop explicit mathematical model and control theory to generate residuals for sensor
fault detection. The proposed observer/estimator in this paper is distributed/networked, which
finds application in large-scale architectures. Similar networked estimators are proposed in the
literature [31]–[37]. A single time-scale networked estimator is developed to track the global state
of the dynamical system over a distributed network of sensors each taking local measurements
with partial observability. Unlike some literature [32]–[34], it is not assumed that the system
is observable in the neighborhood of each sensor, i.e. the system is not necessarily observable
by the measurements directly shared with the sensor. This significantly reduces the connec-
tivity requirements on the sensor network, and therefore reduces the network communication
costs. Similar to [35]–[37], it is assumed that the underlying dynamical system is full-rank and
conditions for networked observability are developed.
The design procedure in this paper is based on structured system theory, previously devel-
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4oped in [38], [39]. Structural (or generic) analysis is widely used in system theory, namely in
fault detection [40], [41] and in distributed observability characterization [42]. Using structural
analysis, the structure of the sensor network and local estimator gain can be designed to satisfy
distributed observability. However, in this paper possible additive faults in sensors are considered
and by mathematically deriving the estimation error and sensor residuals, probabilistic thresholds
on the residuals are obtained based on error covariance, which leads to the fault detection and
isolation logic. Finally, after detecting and isolating the faulty sensor, a graph-theoretic method
is proposed to replace the faulty sensor with an observationally equivalent state measurement
to compensate the loss of observability. To summarize, the main contributions of this paper as
compared with related literature are as follows:
• Considering system/process and measurement noise is a challenge in FDI strategies. This
is mainly due to the fact that it is generally hard to distinguish between the presence of
faults and system/measurement noise as both fault and noise terms may affect the sensor
residuals. In this direction, some works in the literature [7], [11], [18], [25] assume that the
system and/or sensor measurement are noise-free, which is a simplifying assumption. In
this paper, we consider both system and measurement noise and propose a probability-based
threshold design on the residuals to overcome this challenge.
• Following the above comment, many works in FDI and attack detection literature [10], [12],
[13], [43]–[45] assume that the noise variable is upper-bounded, i.e the noise term instead
of taking different values, for example, from Gaussian distribution, only takes values in
a limited range. This simplifying assumption helps to design deterministic thresholds on
the residuals. In this paper, no such assumption is made, and the noise is assumed to be
Gaussian random variable with no upper-bound, which is more realistic as compared to the
mentioned references.
• In this paper, a general LTI system is considered, which generalizes the multi-agent systems
or interconnected systems each possessing a separate dynamics considered in [6], [7], [10],
and the double-integrator system in [8], [9]. Furthermore, the sensor network is considered as
a Strongly-Connected (SC) graph as compared to restrictive regularity condition considered
in [22].
• We adopt a graph-theoretic approach to recover the loss of observability in case of detecting
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5and removing a faulty sensor. This approach is based on our previous works on observational
equivalence [46], [47].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the general framework and state
the problem are presented. Section III provides the networked estimator scenario and develops
the condition for error stability. In Section IV, the algorithm for block-diagonal gain design at
sensors is provided. Section V develops the sensor fault-detection and isolation logic, and in
Section VI, a graph-theoretic method for observability compensation is discussed. Section VII
gives simulation example to illustrate the results. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
We consider noisy discrete-time linear systems as,
xk+1 = Axk + νk, k ≥ 0, (1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the system state and νk = N (0, Q) is the system noise at time-step k.
In this paper, the underlying system matrix A is considered to be full-rank and examples of
such full-rank systems are self-damped dynamical systems [48]. It should be noted that the LTI
system (1) can be also obtained by the discretization of a continuous-time LTI system, based
on Euler or Tustin discretization methods discussed in [48] and both of these methods result
in a full-rank discrete-time LTI system. Moreover, the full-rank condition can be inherent to
the system dynamics, such as in Nearly-Constant-Velocity (NCV) model for target dynamics in
distributed tracking scenarios [49]. In [49], the target is modeled as a discrete-time dynamical
system whose associated matrix is full-rank due to its non-zero diagonal entries. The system
full-rank condition is also considered in the networked estimation literature as in [35]–[37].
The noise/fault-corrupted measurements of the system are taken by N sensors,
y1k
...
yNk
 =

C1
...
CN


x1k
...
xnk
+

ζ1k
...
ζNk
+

f1k
...
fNk

which can be written as the global measurement equation as follows:
yk = Cxk + ζk + fk, (2)
where yk ∈ RN , ζk = N (0, R) is the measurement noise, and fk represents the sensor fault vector.
It is assumed that ζk and νk are zero-mean Gaussian while noise, i.e. E(νk) = 0, E(ζ ik) = 0,
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6for all i, k, and E(νkνm) = 0, for all k 6= m, and similarly, for the measurement noise. Further,
without loss of generality, it is assumed that each sensor measures one of the system states.
The general problem in this paper is to design a stable networked estimation protocol in the
absence of faults, and, then, a fault detection and isolation logic such that to detect possible
faults in sensors. Given the system and measurements as in (1) and (2), a group of sensors is
considered, each embedded with communication and computation equipment to measure a state
of the dynamical system and process the measured data and information received from the other
sensors to estimate the global state of the dynamical system.
Note that unlike many works in the literature [32]–[34], no assumption on the observability
of system in the direct neighborhood of each sensor is considered which implies that the
minimal connectivity on the communication network of agents is required. Each sensor adopts a
single time-scale networked estimation protocol and by proper design of communication network
structure and feedback gain matrix, each sensor tracks the system state by bounded steady-state
estimation error in the fault-free case. In case of fault occurrence, i.e. f ik 6= 0 at any sensor i,
a residual-based fault detection and isolation logic is proposed to detect the faulty sensor by
comparing the sensor residuals with pre-specified thresholds. Note that unlike many work in the
literature [12], [13], [43]–[45], it is not assumed that the system noise and/or measurement noise
are upper-bounded. Finally, by detecting the faulty sensor, one may compensate for possible loss
of observability in the distributed system by introducing a new sensor measurement replacing
the faulty sensor.
III. NETWORKED ESTIMATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our main tool to perform diagnosis as a single time-scale networked
estimation protocol and analyze its error stability criteria. The networked estimator is proposed
based on collaborative consensus on the a-priori estimates at sensors. The estimator is based on
two steps as follows,
x̂ik|k−1 =
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1, (3)
x̂ik|k =x̂
i
k|k−1 +K
iC>i
(
yik − Cix̂ik|k−1
)
, (4)
where x̂ik|k−1 is the estimate of state xk at sensor i given all the measurements up to time k− 1,
x̂ik|k is the estimated state given all the measurements up to time k, the matrix W is a stochastic
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7Fig. 1. Single and multiple time-scale strategies for networked estimation: (Left) multi time-scale also known as average-
consensus based approach, and (Right) single time-scale approach. As it is clear from the figure, in the former scenario many
steps of averaging is performed between every two successive time-steps of system dynamics, while in the latter case only one
step of averaging is done between every two successive steps of system dynamics. The former requires faster processing units,
while the latter is more desirable in real-time applications.
matrix for consensus on a-priori estimates, and Ki is the gain matrix at sensor i. Note that the
row-stochastic condition on W is a necessary condition for (consensus) averaging of a-priori
estimates. Recall that a matrix is row-stochastic if the summation of the entries in each row are
equal to 1, i.e.
∑N
j=1Wij = 1. Further, Nβ(i) defines the neighborhood of sensor i over which the
sensor shares a-priori estimates with the neighboring sensors and this neighborhood follows the
structure of matrix W . In fact Nβ(i) = {j|j → i}∪{i} where j → i implies that sensor j sends
its information to i and Nβ(i) also includes the sensor i itself, i.e. all the diagonal entries of the
matrix W are non-zero. This is due to the fact that each sensor uses its own estimate at previous
time x̂ik−1|k−1 to calculate its a-priori estimate x̂
i
k|k−1. It should be noted that the protocol (3)-(4)
differs from our previous works [38], [39] in two aspects: (i) the protocol in [38], [39] has one
more consensus step on the measurement fusion in which the neighboring measurements are
shared over a different (hub-based) network, while the protocol (3)-(4) only includes one step
of averaging on a-priori estimates. Therefore, the network connectivity condition in this paper
is more relaxed as compared to [38], [39]; (ii) the distributed approach in [38], [39] is fault-free
where the sensor measurements are not accompanied with additive faults and consequently, the
error dynamics analysis is different from this work.
Note that the estimator (3)-(4) is single time-scale as compared to multi time-scale networked
estimation given in [23], [50] where many step of averaging (or consensus) is performed between
every two steps k and k + 1 of system dynamics (see Fig. 1). It is known that the single time-
scale approach is privileged over the multi time-scale method, since the latter requires a large
number of information-exchange and communication over the sensor network between every
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8two successive time-steps of the system dynamics. This implies that the communication time-
scale needs to be much faster than the dynamics, which is not desirable and even may not be
feasible for many large-scale real-time systems. To elaborate this, note that in protocol (3)-(4)
only one step of averaging on a-priori estimates is done between two successive steps k and
k + 1, while the protocol in [50] requires many steps of consensus between steps k and k + 1.
In the multi time-scale estimation, the connectivity of the sensor network is more relaxed due
to more information exchanges among the sensors, while in the single time-scale method, the
sensor network requires more connectivity particularly for rank-deficient dynamical systems. In
fact, it is proved that a SC network may not guarantee error stability for rank-deficient dynamical
systems and certain hub-based network design is necessary, see [38], [39] for details.
Define the error eik at time-step k at sensor i as,
eik =xk|k − x̂ik|k,
=xk −
(
x̂ik|k−1 +K
iC>i (y
i
k − Cix̂ik|k−1)
)
=xk −
( ∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
+KiC>i
(
yik − Ci
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
))
. (5)
By substituting (1)-(2) in above, it follows that:
eik =Axk−1 + νk−1 −
( ∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
+KiC>i
(
Cixk + ζ
i
k + f
i
k
− Ci
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
))
=Axk−1 + νk−1 −
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
−Ki
(
C>i Ci(Axk−1 + νk−1) + C
>
i ζ
i
k
+ C>i f
i
k − C>i Ci
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
)
Recall that the row-stochastic condition of W implies that
∑N
j=1Wij = 1. Note that for j ∈
Nβ(i), Wij 6= 0 and for j /∈ Nβ(i), Wij = 0. Therefore, the row-stochastic condition can be
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9re-written as
∑
j∈Nβ(i)Wij = 1. Based on this fact, it follows that (see [39] for similar analysis):
Axk−1 =
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAxk−1,
and consequently:
eik =
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAxk−1 −
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
−KiC>i Ci
( ∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAxk−1 −
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAx̂
j
k−1|k−1
)
+ νk−1 −KiC>i ζ ik −KiC>i f ik −KiC>i Ciνk−1
=
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAe
j
k−1 −KiC>i Ci
∑
j∈Nβ(i)
WijAe
j
k−1 + η
i
k,
where ηik collects the noise terms and fault term as follows:
ηik = νk−1 −Ki
(
C>i ζ
i
k + C
>
i f
i
k + C
>
i Ciνk−1
)
. (6)
The collective error at the group of sensors is defined as the concatenation of errors at all sensors,
i.e. ek = (e1>k , . . . , e
N>
k )
>. For the collective error, it follows that:
ek = Âek−1 + ηk, (7)
where Â = W ⊗A−KDC(W ⊗A) with K = blockdiag(Ki) and DC = blockdiag(C>i Ci). The
collective noise vector is given as:
ηk = 1N ⊗ νk−1 −KDC(1N ⊗ νk−1)−KDCζk −KDCfk, (8)
where 1N is the vector of 1s of size N and DC = blockdiag(C>i ).
To stabilize the error dynamics (7), it is necessary that the pair (W ⊗A,DC) to be observable
[51]. Note that the observability analysis of Kronecker product of matrices (and the associated
composite graph) is discussed in details in [52], where it is proved that for observability of
(W ⊗A,DC), the matrix W needs to be irreducible. This implies that the sensor network needs
to be Strongly-Connected (SC). In fact, this is also discussed in [38], and since the protocol
(3)-(4) is a variant of the protocol in [38], the same analysis can be adopted here to prove the
irreducibility of W matrix. Therefore, any irreducible matrix (associated with a SC network) with
non-zero diagonal entries while satisfying the row-stochastic condition can work as W matrix.
The SC connectivity of the sensor network is also considered in similar networked estimation
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literature, see for example [35]–[37]. Note that the (W ⊗ A,DC)-observability is also referred
as networked observability (or distributed observability) condition. As it is explained in the next
section, having (W ⊗A,DC)-observability satisfied, using Linear-Matrix-Inequalities (LMI), the
block-diagonal gain matrix K can be designed such that Â is a Schur matrix [38], [53], [54],
i.e. ρ(Â) < 1 where ρ defines the spectral radius of a matrix.
IV. DESIGN OF BLOCK-DIAGONAL FEEDBACK GAIN BASED ON LMI APPROACH
In this section, we discuss the methodology for computation of a block-diagonal estimator
gain K. Note that, the observability of (W⊗A,DC) in the distributed estimator (3)-(4) guarantees
the existence of a full matrix K, such that ρ(W ⊗A−KDC(W ⊗A)) < 1. However, for having
a distributed approach, the gain matrix is required to be block-diagonal. Such K is known to be
the solution of an LMI as follows: X Â>X
XÂ X
  0⇒
 X Â>
Â Y
  0, (9)
where Â = W ⊗A−KDC(W ⊗A) and X  0 with  denoting positive definiteness. Note that
the left-hand-side of the above equation is nonlinear in K; however its equivalent solution is
proposed in the literature [55], [56] as the right-hand-side in (9) with X = Y −1. Now, having the
above LMI to be linear in K, we note that the constraint X = Y −1 is a non-convex constraint.
However, this constraint can be approximated with a linear function of the matrices X, Y  0,
satisfy X = Y −1 as the optimal point of the following optimization problem [54]:
min trace(XY )
s.t.
 X I
I Y
  0,
K is block-diagonal.
(10)
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with X, Y  0. Overall, the optimization is summarized as follows; with (W ⊗A,DC) observ-
ability, the gain matrix K is the solution to the following:
min trace(XY )
s.t. X, Y  0, X Â>
Â Y
  0,
 X I
I Y
  0,
K is block-diagonal.
(11)
It should be mentioned that a solution of the second LMI is equivalent to X = Y −1, which
results in an optimal value for minimum trace as nN . Furthermore, trace(XY ) can be replaced
with the linear approximation trace(Y0X +X0Y )/2 [54], and the iterative Algorithm 1 can be
used to minimize this problem under given constraints.
Given: A,W,DC
Result: Gain matrix K
Find feasible points X0, Y0, K;
while ρ(Â) > 1 do
minimize trace(YtX +XtY ) under the constraints given in equation (11) and
find X, Y,K;
Yt+1 = Y ;
Xt+1 = X;
t = t+ 1;
end
Algorithm 1: Iterative calculation of block-diagonal gain K.
In [54], it is shown that trace(YtX + XtY ) is non-increasing and converges to 2nN . In this
regard, a stopping criterion of the algorithm is established as reaching within 2nN +  of the
trace objective. Interested readers may refer to [53]–[57] for more details. It should be noted that
this algorithm (and in general similar cone-complementarity algorithms) are of polynomial-order
complexity, see [58], [59].
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V. SENSOR FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
In this section, we present our results on the development of sensor fault detection and isolation
scheme for the considered system. Following the terminology in [60], given the estimated state
x̂ik|k, define the estimated output at sensor i as ŷ
i
k = Cix̂
i
k|k. Note that for fault-free case y
i
k− ŷik
is steady-state stable and bounded by proper design of W and K matrices. Thus, define the
residual signal at sensor i at time-step k as,
rik =|yik − ŷik| = |yik − Cix̂ik|k| = |Cieik + ζ ik + f ik|
=|CiÂiek−1 + Ciηik + ζ ik + f ik| (12)
where Âi is the ith hyper-row of the matrix Â defined as the block of rows from row (i−1)n+1
to row in. Moreover, Ciηik can be written as:
Ciη
i
k =Ciνk−1 − CiKiC>i ζ ik − CiKiC>i f ik
− CiKiC>i Ciνk−1. (13)
Assume that sensor i is faulty at some time-interval, i.e. f ik 6= 0 for k1 < k. Note that, considering
(12) and (13), the estimation error is now affected by the sensor fault. In this case for the
residual at sensor i, the term CiKiC>i f
i
k 6= 0 and f ik 6= 0 in (12) and (13), while for other
sensors CjKjC>j f
j
k = 0. Note that among many possible choices for the gain matrix K, it can
be designed such that the term CiKiC>i is large enough to make r
i
k more affected by the fault
f ik. Thus, although f
i
k may also appear in ηk−1 and ek−1, since ρ(Â) < 1 the term CiÂiek−1 in
(12) remains small and negligible as compared to larger values of f ik and CiK
iC>i f
i
k. Therefore,
by Schur stability of matrix Â and proper choice of the gain matrix K, the residual at faulty
sensor i is more affected while for the other sensors j 6= i, the residuals are less affected since
f jk = 0. The fault detection and isolation logic is therefore as follows: if the residual r
i
k at
sensor i exceeds a predefined threshold then sensor i is faulty. Thus, we need to define the
thresholds on residuals for fault detection and isolation. In this direction, considering Gaussian
noise N (0, Q) for system dynamics and N (0, R) for measurement noise, first the variance of
the estimation error eik is obtained and consequently one can define a threshold such that to
detect faults whenever the residual exceeds this threshold.
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Let Pk = E(eke>k ) and Σ = E(ηkη>k ). Then, it follows that:
Pk =ÂPk−1Â> + Σ
=ÂkP0(Â
>)k +
k−1∑
j=0
ÂjΣ(Â>)j. (14)
Recall that ρ(Â) < 1, in the steady-state we have,
P∞ = lim
k→∞
Pk =
∞∑
j=0
ÂjΣ(Â>)j.
Let b = ‖Â‖2 < 1, then using the result of [61] it can be proved that,
‖P∞‖2 ≤ ‖Σ‖2
1− b2 . (15)
On the other hand, for the fault-free case,
ηkη
>
k =(INn −KDC)(1NN ⊗ νk−1ν>k−1)(INn −KDC)>
+ (KDC)ζkζ
>
k (KDC)
> (16)
where 1NN is N by N matrix of 1s. Then,
Σ =(INn −KDC)(1NN ⊗Q)(INn −KDC)>
+ (KDC)R(KDC)
> (17)
The 2-norm of Σ is upper-bounded by,
‖Σ‖2 ≤‖(INn −KDC)(1NN ⊗Q)(INn −KDC)>‖2
+ ‖(KDC)R(KDC)>‖2
≤‖INn −KDC‖22N‖Q‖2 + ‖K‖22‖R‖2 (18)
where R = blockdiag(C>i RiCi). Let ‖INn − KDC‖22 = α1, ‖K‖22 = α2, and ‖R‖2 = β‖R‖2.
Then, from (15) and scaling the error covariance by N (number of sensors),
‖P∞‖2
N
≤ α1N‖Q‖2 + α2β‖R‖2
N(1− b2) = Φ (19)
In fact, equation (19) gives an upper-bound on the variance of estimation error at each sensor
eik. Following the Gaussianity of estimation error, one can claim that with probability more than
68% the estimation error lies within |eik −E(eik)| < Φ. It can be proved that in the steady state,
September 28, 2020 DRAFT
14
the fault-free estimation error is unbiased, i.e. E(eik) = 0 [61]. Therefore, one can claim that
with probability more than 68% we have rik = |Cieik + ζ ik| < cΦ +R where the constant c is the
absolute value of the measurement vector (with the assumption of having one state measurement
by every sensor, c is the absolute value of the nonzero entry of Ci). Similarly, with probability
more than 95%, the residual lies below 2cΦ+2R, i.e. rik < 2cφ+2R, and with probability more
than 99% we have rik < 3cΦ + 3R, etc. Therefore, in the presence of possible sensor faults,
one can detect and isolate sensor faults by comparing thresholds with the residuals based on
these probabilities. In other words, considering T68% = cΦ +R as threshold, one can claim fault
detection with probability 68% whenever the residual goes over this threshold. In this case, the
probability of false alarm is less than 32%. Similarly, stronger thresholds for fault detection and
isolation can be defined as T95% = 2cΦ + 2R, T99% = 3cΦ + 3R, etc.
VI. SENSOR REPLACEMENT FOR OBSERVABILITY RECOVERY
The measurement of faulty sensors may be compensated in terms of observability recovery
and in this direction, the concept of observational equivalence is a relevant term [46], [47]. The
faulty sensor measurement can be replaced by a measurement of an equivalent state to recover
the loss of observability. Note that in this paper, to avoid trivial case, it is assumed that the
fault is inherent with the measurement of the specific state measured by the faulty sensor. This
could be due to, for example, environmental condition of the sensor location resulting to the
fault/anomaly at the sensor.
Extending the results of [62] to dual case of network observability, the set of necessary sensor
measurements can be found over digraph representation of the dynamical system. Note that the
system digraph, denoted by G, is defined as the graph associated with the system matrix A,
or the structured system matrix A representing the zero-nonzero pattern of A. In G every state
is represented by a node and every non-zero entry Aij (or Aij) is represented by a link from
node i to node j. It is known that many generic properties of the system, including observability
and controllability, can be defined over this graph [63]. As an example, consider the following
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Fig. 2. The system digraph associated with the structured system matrix (20). The self-cycles are shown by a small line on the
right-hand-side of the nodes. Nodes of the same color belong to the same SCC. The SCCs inside the black dashed rectangles
are parent SCCs.
structured system matrix,
A =

∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ∗
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0

(20)
where ∗ represents a non-zero entry and as an example a non-zero entry in A51 implies a link
from node 5 to node 1 in G. The system digraph G associated to (20) is shown in Fig. 2. In
the system digraph, G, a Strongly-Connected-Component (SCC) denoted by S is defined as a
subgraph in which there is a path from every node to every other node. Among the SCCs, define
a parent SCC, denoted by Sp, as the SCC with no outgoing link to other SCCs. In Fig. 2, the
SCCs and parent SCCs associated with the structured system matrix (20) are shown. As it can
be seen from this figure, the SCC may only include a single node.
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It can be proved that the measurement of at least one node in every parent SCC is necessary
for system observability [62], while all state nodes in the same parent SCC are observationally
equivalent. This implies that the measurements of all nodes in the parent SCC equivalently
recover the observability of the system digraph, G.
In this direction, our proposed logic for sensor replacement is as follows: if the faulty sensor
measures a state in a parent SCC Spi , one can compensate the loss of observability by adding a
new sensor measurement of another state node in Spi . Otherwise, if the faulty sensor measures
a state in no parent SCC, the faulty sensor can be removed with no affect on the estimation
performance of the other sensors. For example, in Fig. 2 if the measurement of state 8 is faulty
and is removed, measurement of either states 6 or 7 may recover the loss of observability. Note
that if the faulty sensor does not measure a necessary system state (a state in a parent SCC),
its removal has no affect on distributed observability, and only the communication network
needs to be restructured to satisfy the strong connectivity of the sensor network as mentioned
in Section III. For example, in Fig. 2 a faulty sensor measuring any state in {2, 5, 9, 10} can be
removed without loss of system observability. It should be noted that if the parent SCC includes
a single node (also referred as parent node), there is no replacement for the faulty measurement.
This implies that the parent nodes are more vulnerable to attacks and faults in terms of recovering
system observability. For example, this is the case for the measurement of state 1 in Fig. 2.
VII. SIMULATIONS
A. An Illustrative Example
Consider a linear dynamical system with the structure given by the system digraph in Fig. 3.
The full-rank system of 12 states with associated structured matrix (20) is considered to be tracked
by a network of 4 sensors. The non-zero entries of A are chosen such that ρ(A) = 1.2 > 1
implying an unstable system dynamics. The system and measurement noise are N (0, 0.04). The
measured states are represented by green nodes. Given the set of measurements as in Fig. 3, it
can be checked that one state node in every parent SCC Sp1 = {1}, Sp2 = {3, 4}, Sp3 = {6, 7, 8},
Sp4 = {11, 12} is measured and therefore the pair (A,C) is observable. The sensors estimate
the system state over time using the networked estimator (3)-(4). The sensors share their a-
priori estimates over the SC communication network (or sensor network) shown in Fig. 3. This
network represents the structure of W matrix while the entries of W are chosen randomly such
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3 4 
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Fig. 3. An illustrative example for networked estimation of dynamical system over a sensor network where the 12 nodes graph
in the bottom is the system digraph associated with a full-rank dynamical system, the green states are measured by sensors, and
the sensor network on top includes a SC communication network of 4 sensors with faulty sensors 3 and 4.
that the stochasticity of W is satisfied. Having W to be irreducible, for the networked system the
conditions for networked observability (or distributed observability) are hold [42]. Therefore, one
can design the proper gain matrix K using the LMI procedure described in Section IV. Applying
this block-diagonal K matrix, ρ(Â) < 1 and therefore all sensor errors are stable.
Next, it is assumed that the sensor 3 is faulty after time-step 25 and sensor 4 is faulty after
time-step 40, i.e. f3k≥25 = 0.6, f
4
k≥40 = 0.4. The residuals corresponding to this fault scenario are
shown in Fig. 4. As shown in this figure, the faulty sensors can be detected and isolated once
the residuals corresponding to the faulty sensor exceed the thresholds. For this simulation, we
have b = ‖Â‖2 = 0.63, α1 = ‖I48−KDC‖22 = 3.83, α2 = ‖K‖22 = 3.84, |C3K3C>3 | = 3.01, and
|C4K4C>4 | = 3.05. Further, the non-zero entries of the measurement matrix C are considered
to be equal to 1, and therefore β = 1 and c = 1. Then, using equation (19), it follows that
Φ = 0.31 and the thresholds are,
T68% = 0.35, T95% = 0.70, T99% = 1.05. (21)
Based on these thresholds, one can claim the detection of fault at sensor 3 with probability more
than 99% and fault at sensor 4 with probability more than 95%. The probability of false alarms
are less than 1% and less than 5%, respectively.
Next, one can compensate for measurement of the faulty sensors by replacing observationally
equivalent state measurements from Sp3 = {6, 7, 8} and Sp4 = {11, 12}. In Fig. 5, the set of states
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Fig. 4. The residuals of 4 sensors monitoring the system states to detect possible faults at sensors where the residuals
corresponding to sensors 3 and 4 exceed T99% and T95% thresholds, implying that the sensor 3 and sensor 4 are faulty, with
probability more than 99% and 95%, respectively.
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3ܤ 4ܤ 
State Sensor Measurement 
Fig. 5. Observability recovery where the set of states {11, 12} and {6, 7, 8} whose measurements are observationally equivalent
are shown, respectively, in blue and brown colors. The faulty sensors 3 and 4 in Fig. 3 are replaced with new sensors 3B and
4B, respectively, measuring the observationally equivalent states 11 and 7.
which are observationally equivalent to state 12 (measured by sensor 3) and to state 8 (measured
by sensor 4) are, respectively, shown in blue and brown colors. Replacing the faulty sensors 3
and 4 with sensors 3B and 4B measuring observationally equivalent states 11 and 7, the loss of
observability for estimation procedure is recovered. Note that we assume communication links
for sensors 3B and 4B to be the same as sensor 3 and 4. The Mean-Squared-Estimation-Error
(MSEE) at all sensors in the compensated framework is shown in Fig. 6. As it is clear the MSEE
is bounded steady-state stable at all sensors.
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Fig. 6. The MSEE at 4 sensors given in Fig. 5 with sensor 3B replacing the faulty sensor 3 and sensor 4B replacing the
faulty sensor 4 in Fig. 3.
As compared to simulations in [3], [4], [19] where the underlying dynamical system is stable,
the example in this section provides a distributed estimation and fault detection of an unstable
system. As compared to [10], [12], [13], [43]–[45], in this example the noise follows Gaussian
distribution and no bound on the noise is assumed. Moreover, in [7], [11], [18], [25], no system
and/or measurement noise is considered. As compared to the distributed estimation in [32]–[34]
which requires a complete all-to-all network of sensors (i.e. for this example every sensor is
directly connected to all other 3 sensors), our networked estimator only requires an SC sensor
network. Among the related literature, we provide a comparison with a recent work in the next
subsection.
B. A Comparison Study
Here, our proposed sensor fault detection, isolation, and distributed estimation protocol is
compared with the recent work [23]. In [23], a multi time-scale resilient distributed estimation
strategy is proposed along with attack/fault detection. The reason for selecting this work for com-
parison is that its assumptions and framework is similar to our proposed strategy in the following
aspects: (i) it considers the underlying system dynamics to be unstable; (ii) the estimation and
attack detection scheme is not centralized but distributed over a sensor network; (iii) it assumes
a connected undirected network of sensors, while similarly we assume a SC network; and (iv) an
additive term is considered in the presence of noise on the sensors representing possible biasing
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attacks/faults at sensors similar to our assumption. Note that in [23], each sensor performs L
steps of (consensus) averaging over the sensor network between every two steps k − 1 and k
of system dynamics and it is claimed that the proposed protocol is resilient to sensor faults
of certain magnitude, while it is capable of detecting and isolating the attacked sensors in
certain conditions. They particularly state that under certain conditions the attacked sensor can
be detected while some other attacks cannot be detected (remain stealthy), and therefore two sets
of detectable attacking set (DAS) and undetectable (or stealthy) attacking set (UAS) are defined.
The proposed strategy in [23] is simulated over the same dynamic system and sensor network
in Fig. 3 and all the conditions including initial state values, noise values, etc are considered
similar to the previous subsection, while the sensor network is reconsidered as an undirected
cycle 1 ↔ 2 ↔ 3 ↔ 4 ↔ 1. The parameters for the distributed estimation protocol are as in
Table I.
TABLE I
PRAMETER VALUES FOR RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION AND ATTACK DETECTION PROTOCOL IN [23].
L 20 α 0.2 β 0.5
‖A‖ 1.37 γ 0.21 N 4
s 2 bw 0.1 bv 0.1
λ0 1.9 η0 0.1 ρt0 0.1
Under these parameters the MSEE of 4 sensors are shown in Fig. 7. Note that in this simulation,
every sensor performs L = 20 steps of consensus on estimations of neighboring sensors as
compared to 1 step consensus in protocol (3)-(4). This requires a processing setup 20 times
faster than our proposed networked estimation setup. The sensor attack detection logic in [23]
is as follows: if the measurement update yik − CiAx̂ik−1 is larger than a pre-defined threshold
Φk, then the attack at sensor i is detected, otherwise the sensor is either attack-free or the
attack remains undetected (stealthy). Running the proposed attack detection in [23] based on
the parameters in Table I, the measurement updates and the threshold Φk are shown in Fig. 8.
As it is clear from this figure, both attacks/faults at sensors 3 and 4 are not large enough to
be detected and both remain stealthy. However, as shown in Fig. 4, our proposed approach can
detect and isolate both faults.
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Fig. 7. The MSEE at 4 sensors state estimation under the proposed protocol in [23].
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Fig. 8. The threshold Φk and the measurement updates at 4 sensors estimating the system in Fig. 3 under the proposed attack
detection scheme in [23]. As claimed in [23] the attack/fault is detected if the measurement updates exceed the Φk. In this case,
both attacks/faults at sensor 3 and 4 remain undetected (stealthy).
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, a fault detection and isolation scenario for a networked estimator is presented
by defining the sensor residuals and probability-based thresholds to detect and isolate sensor
faults. The thresholds are defined based on the upper-bound on the norm of the estimation error
covariance. It should be emphasized that the FDI and distributed estimation strategy in this paper
is of polynomial order computational complexity. In fact, the protocol (3)-(4) as a variant of the
protocol in [39] is of P-order complexity and according to [58], [59], Algorithm 1 and similar
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cone-complementarity algorithms are of P-order complexity, implying that the design of block-
diagonal gain matrix in Section IV is of P-order complexity. For fault detection and mitigation
strategy, the decomposition of the system digraph into SCCs, determining their partial order, and
finding parent SCCs are based on the Depth-First-Search (DFS) algorithm [64] with complexity
O(n2). The computational complexity of the threshold design in (19) based on the 2-norm of
the covariance is O(n3). Therefore, the overall strategy in this paper is of P-order complexity
and hence scalable to large-scale applications. Note that although the simulation in Section VII
is given for a small-scale example system, the P-order complexity guarantees the scalability of
the proposed scheme to large-scale systems.
It is worth noting that the fault detection and isolation can be improved by defining tighter
upper-bounds on the residuals. This can be done by designing the gain matrix K to reduce
‖INn −KDC‖22, and ‖K‖22. The optimal LMI approach to optimize the gain K to satisfy such
conditions is the direction of our future research. A promising topic of future interest is optimal
design of the communication network (the structure of the matrix W ) and cost-optimal selection
of measurements for observability recovery to reduce the estimation costs at sensor network.
This may include reducing both the sensor embedding costs and communication costs in sensor
networks. As another direction of future research we are currently working to extend this fault
detection and isolation as well as fault compensation scenario to general rank-deficient systems.
In this direction, the networked estimation protocol needs to be updated to consider measurement
sharing over the sensor network.
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